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ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO A REAR-END COLLISION DOCTRINE 
INSTRUCTION. 
A. Plaintiff Preserved The Issue For Appeal. 
Defendant argues that plaintiff failed to preserve this issue 
for appeal. Defendant's Brief pp. 10-12. Plaintiff does not 
object to defendants discussion of the basic principles of law 
relating to preservation of an issue for appeal, but notes that 
defendant has failed to properly apply these principles to the 
present case. 
As stated in her primary brief, plaintiff's counsel requested 
a jury instruction setting forth a rear-end collision doctrine 
based upon Bullock v. Unqricht, 538 P.2d 190 (Utah 1975). This 
proposed instruction reads as follows: 
In most cases where one car "rear-ends" another, it 
accords with common sense and experience to believe that 
the following car has disregarded the duty to keep a 
lookout ahead and to keep the car under control, and is, 
therefore, at fault. But such a conclusion is not 
necessarily always correct. It may depend upon the 
particular circumstances. 
(R. 237) While this instruction may "[validate] common sense," as 
stated by defendant, (Defendant's Brief p. 13), it also sets forth 
the rear-end collision doctrine proposed by plaintiff. In essence, 
it indicates that the jury may infer that the rear-ending driver is 
at fault because he has failed in his duty to keep a proper 
lookout, and that such an inference or presumption is rebuttable 
depending upon the circumstances. 
Plaintiff requested this instruction prior to trial. (R. 237) 
Plaintiff's counsel, Mr. Howard, also orally argued the merit of 
this instruction before the court on his motion for directed 
verdict, stating, ,f[Y]ou can't run into the back of a vehicle 
without a logical explanation," that the defendant had to make the 
explanation and, otherwise, that the inference was that of 
negligence. (T. 2 06) The court explicitly rejected plaintiff's 
position. (T. 215-16) 
After the court instructed the jury, Mr. Howard reminded the 
court that he had a directed verdict instruction which the court 
had refused to give. During the course of this conversation, Mr. 
Howard stated, "The weather is something that's obvious to you and 
you can arrive in accordance with it. The fact it is snowing 
doesn't eliminate the responsibility of a driver to avoid hitting 
cars in front of him. That's why I'm entitled to a directed 
verdict." (T. 215-16) The court again rejected Mr. Howard's 
argument. 
Defendant suggests that plaintiff did not preserve the issue 
for appeal by failing to object when the court did not include the 
instruction at issue in the jury instructions. Defendant's Brief 
p. 11. It is well settled that an attorney is not required to 
pursue a clearly futile action to preserve an issue for appeal. In 
the present case, the instruction had been presented to the court. 
The theory behind the instruction had been argued before the court, 
and had been explicitly rejected by the court. Continued argument 
of the issue would have been a fruitless exercise in futility. 
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The purpose behind Utah R. Civ. P. 51 's requirement that a 
party must object to the failure to give an instruction is to give 
the judge a chance to address the issue and rule on it, thereby 
affording him the opportunity to correct any errors made during the 
trial. "A matter is sufficiently raised if it has been submitted 
to the trial court and the trial court has had the opportunity to 
make findings of fact or law." James v. Preston. 746 P.2d 799, 801 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987) . This requirement has clearly been met. 
Accordingly, defendant7s argument must fail. 
B. This Presumption Raises An Issue Of First Impression, And 
Is Compatible With Existing Utah Law, 
The Utah appellate courts frequently consider issues of first 
impresssion. This Court has stated that it is receptive to novel 
theories of law when they are supported by firm logic and have some 
basis in established precedent. State v. Burton. 800 P. 2d 817, 819 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). Because the Utah courts have not 
specifically addressed the issue of a rear-end collision 
presumption, plaintiff is now inviting this Court to make such a 
consideration. 
In this light, plaintiff does not dispute defendant7s 
assertion that Bullock v. Unqricht, 538 P.2d at 190, from which the 
proposed instruction was derived, does not set forth the proposed 
presumption, but only acknowledges a "common sense" rule. That the 
Court has not addressed the issue of an inference or presumption in 
Bullock does not limit plaintiff from pursuing the issue. 
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Defendant argues that an instruction outlining a presumption 
overemphasizes the plaintiffs case. Defendant's Brief p. 13. 
"*Presumptions' are rules based upon experience or public policy 
and established in the law to assist the jury in ascertaining the 
truth." Bettner v. Boring, 764 P.2d 829, 831-32 (Colo. 1988). The 
instruction proposed by plaintiff does not overemphasize the 
plaintiff's case but, as stated by defendant, simply "validates 
common sense." Defendant's Brief p. 13. 
The proposed doctrine is modeled after the evidentiary 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur set forth in Virginia S. v. Salt Lake 
Care Center. 741 P.2d 969, 971 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). "The doctrine 
of res ipsa loquitur applies because the plaintiff could not 
reasonably be expected to account for any cause of the accident not 
within his knowledge" where the accident was the sort that would 
not have happened had the defendant used due care and had the 
plaintiff not been negligent in causing the accident. Boring v. 
Bettner, 739 P.2d 884, 885 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987). Virginia S. 
asserts that 
[t]he doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is an evidentiary 
doctrine used in a negligence action to establish the 
defendant's duty of care and the breach of that duty. To 
rely on this doctrine, the plaintiff must establish a 
sufficient evidentiary foundation to support application 
of the doctrine and its inference of negligence. 
Virginia S., 741 P.2d at 971 (citations omitted). 
Defendant also argues that a plaintiff, under such a 
presumption, would not have to prove her case, in contravention of 
Utah law. Defendant's Brief p. 14. This is not true. Under the 
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proposed doctrine, which is an application of the doctrine of res 
judicata, the plaintiff would have to prove the applicability of 
the presumption to his or her set of facts before the jury could 
consider it. As discussed in plaintiff's brief in chief, the 
plaintiff would have to show that: (1) the accident was such that 
it would not normally have occurred had the following driver used 
due care; (2) that the following vehicle was, at the time of the 
accident, under the management and control of the defendant; and 
(3) the accident was not caused by the plaintiff's negligence. 
See. Virginia S. . 741 P.2d at 971 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Plaintiff's 
Brief p. 22-24. Once the plaintiff established that the 
presumption applied to his or her set of facts, he or she would 
also have to prove causation. Only once the plaintiff had met this 
burden would the defendant have to come forward. Just as in the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the elements of negligence would not 
be circumvented. 
Defendant presents the following scenario as a possible 
consequence should this Court adopt plaintiff's proposed 
presumption: 
Such an instruction would allow a party who, after 
passing a vehicle, could swerve directly in front of that 
vehicle, slam on her brakes, cause a collision, and walk 
into court having a burden placed upon the following 
driver to present exculpatory evidence or have the jury 
forced to find for the plaintiff. 
Defendant's Brief p. 14. Such a scenario is not possible under the 
presumption proposed by plaintiff. In defendant's hypothetical, 
the party could not carry his or her burden of showing that the 
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accident was not caused by her negligence. In the absence of such 
proof, the presumption would be inapplicable and the plaintiffs 
case would fail. The presumption, therefore, would not place the 
burden of proof on the defendant in such a case. 
Defendant argues that in presenting such a presumption, "the 
trial court would be, in fact, instructing the jury that the mere 
fact an accident happens indicates the defendant was negligent in 
contradiction of Utah law." Defendants Brief p. 14. Such is not 
the case. The plaintiff has to first carry her burden of proof in 
showing that the presumption is applicable, as discussed above. 
Plaintiff does not argue with the validity or applicability of 
Instruction 11 as discussed by defendant. Defendant's Brief p. 15. 
Plaintiff, however, notes that the presumption, as she has 
presented it, recognizes the duties set forth in this instruction 
and does not conflict with them. For the presumption to be 
applicable, as discussed previously, the plaintiff must prove that 
he or she did not negligently cause the accident, e.g., that he or 
she is observing all the duties set forth in the instruction, 
including keeping a proper lookout, driving at a safe speed for the 
conditions, keeping the vehicle under proper control, following 
other vehicles at a safe distance, and stopping or slowing down 
suddenly only after observing that it can be done safely. 
Defendant refers to Harris v. Utah Transit Authority. 671 P.2d 
217, 221 (Utah 1983) for the proposition that if a motorist who 
collides with a stationary vehicle is not guilty of negligence as 
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a matter of law and that an accident involving moving vehicles is 
even less compelling, and stated that plaintiff pointed this out. 
Defendant's Brief p. 16. Defendant's presentation of plaintiff's 
argument is disingenuous; plaintiff noted this case for the 
proposition that the present issue had not been explicitly ruled 
upon by the Utah courts so was a case of first impression, and that 
the presumption does not create a per se rule that a motorist rear-
ending a vehicle is guilty of negligence as a matter of law, but is 
rebuttable and must be shown to be applicable. Plaintiff's Brief 
pp. 20-22. 
For these reasons, defendant's arguments on this issue are 
without merit and may be disregarded by this Court. 
C. A Presumption Of Negligence Is An Application Of The 
Doctrine Of Res Ipsa Loquitur. 
Plaintiff argues that the present accident "is not one of a 
kind which, in the ordinary course of events, would not have 
happened had the defendant used due care," but "arose out of 
extraordinary circumstances where extreme care could have been and 
was exercised by defendant, but a minor and insignificant touching 
of the vehicles occurred nonetheless," making the accident the 
wrong sort for the application of res ipsa loquitur. Defendant's 
Brief p. 17. Plaintiff pointed out that this was not the case, but 
that the accident occurred during normal and expected winter 
7 
driving conditions,1 Plaintiff also provided evidence that this 
"minor and insignificant touching of vehicles" caused her a 
substantial amount of damage both to her person and her vehicle. 
Defendants argument is his theory of the case. Plaintiff's 
argument is her theory of the case. Both parties presented 
evidence to support their theories of the case. Under well 
established rules of litigation, once a party has produced evidence 
supporting his or her theory of the case, he or she is entitled to 
instructions which educate the jury upon the theory, regardless of 
what the other party's theory of the case might be, and regardless 
of what the jury ultimately might find. For example, "[e]ven when 
a plaintiff is contributorily negligent he is still entitled to the 
rear-end collision presumption instruction." Boring, 739 P.2d at 
885. "Where there is evidence adduced to support a party's theory 
of the case, it is prejudicial error for the trial court to fail to 
instruct thereon." Watters v. Ouerry, 626 P.2d 455, 458 (Utah 
1981). That the trial court deprived plaintiff of such an 
instruction, after plaintiff had carried her initial burden of 
proof, constitutes reversible error. 
Defendant argues that "[t]he presumption argued by plaintiff 
cannot be rejected by the jury and therefore is distinguishable 
from Utah law." Defendant's Brief p. 18. This characterization of 
plaintiff's argument is totally inaccurate. Plaintiff stated: 
1
 Mr. Howard stated: "The weather is something that's obvious to you and you can arrive in 
accordance with it. The fact it's snowing doesn't eliminate the responsiblity of a driver to avoid 
hitting cars in front of him. That's why I'm entitled to a directed verdict." (R. 215) 
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The application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does 
not violate Utah's ruling against finding negligence as 
a matter of law in a rear end collision because the 
instruction is a means of presenting the leading car's 
theory of the case to the jury, and even though the 
driver may be entitled to an instruction, whether the 
presumption applies is the jury's province to determine. 
"When a rear-end collision instruction is given to the 
jury, the jury is instructed that the presumption is 
rebuttable." Bettner, 764 P. 2d at 832. "[0]nce the 
elements of res ipsa loquitur have been established, it 
merely permits and does not compel the inference of 
negligence by the fact finder." Kusv, 681 P. 2d at 1235; 
accord Ballow v. Monroe, 699 P.2d 719, 723 (Utah 1985). 
Thus, the use of the presumption instruction does not 
deprive the jury of the deliberative function so highly 
regarded by the Utah court. 
Plaintiff's Brief p. 26. 
As noted above, both res ipsa loquitur and the proposed 
presumption are evidentiary doctrines. The similar instruction at 
issue in Bettner v. Boring stated that fl[u]nless and until the 
presumption is outweighed by evidence to the contrary which has 
been proved by a preponderance of the evidence, you must consider 
the presumption with the other evidence in arriving at your 
verdict." Bettner. 764 P.2d at 831-32 (emphasis added). This 
merely permits and does not compel the inference of negligence by 
the fact finder; it does not remove the deliberative function from 
o 
the fact finder. This Court should, accordingly, disregard 
defendant's erroneous characterizations of plaintiff's arguments. 
Defendant's Brief p. 18. 
Defendant finally argues that the Utah application of res ipsa 
loquitur is different from the Colorado application from which 
Bettner is derived, in that the Utah law only infers negligence 
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while the Colorado law presumes negligence. Defendant's Brief p. 
18. Defendant has provided no language from either the Colorado or 
Utah courts to support this assertion. In fact, the above-quoted 
language from Bettner suggests that the Colorado law infers rather 
than presumes negligence, also. Because defendant's assertion is 
unsupported, this Court should disregard it. 
For these reasons, defendant's arguments are without merit. 
D. Under The Facts, Plaintiff Was Entitled To The Rear-End 
Collision Instruction. 
Defendant's characterization of Colorado law in Section I.E. 
of his brief is a maze of confusion. In one sentence, defendant 
states that the "State of Colorado presumes negligence, sufficient 
to make out only a prima facie case, when the following driver is 
involved in a rear-end collision," but then states that "[t]he 
[Bettner] court held that there was not [sic] presumption of the 
defendant's negligence since colliding with the rear of plaintiff's 
truck bespeaks negligence no more than colliding with the front of 
it." Defendant's Brief p. 19. Such an argument cannot be 
followed, so must be disregarded. 
Defendant argues that plaintiff should not rely upon rules of 
law relating to a rear end presumption derived from Boring v. 
Bettner, 739 P.2d at 885 because it was overruled the following 
year by Bettner. 764 P.2d at 829. Defendant's Brief p. 20. This 
argument is insubstantial; although it is true that Bettner 
reversed the outcome of Boring, Bettner did not reject the rear-end 
collision doctrine, but limited its application to situations 
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comparable to the present case, in which "the negligence followed 
by the collision occurred while both vehicles were on the roadway 
or shoulder, in relatively close proximity, and facing in the same 
direction." Bettner, 764 P. 2d at 834. Plaintiff did not ignore 
this obvious fact; because of the nature of Bettner's holding, it 
was not pertinent to her argument so she did not deem it to be 
necessary to point it out. 
Further, plaintiff's purpose in citing to Bettner was not that 
the particular facts in Bettner were the same as the present facts 
and, thereby, suggested the same conclusion, but to outline the 
principles of the rear-end collision doctrine set forth in the 
case. Because the facts in Bettner are dissimilar to the present 
facts, the specific application of the Bettner holding does not 
apply, even though the general principles of law outlined therein 
are applicable. Defendant's argument set forth on p. 22 of his 
brief is, therefore, irrelevant to the issues at hand. 
Defendant cites to Saliman v. Silk, 194 P. 2d 304 (Colo. 1948) 
for the proposition that "[W]hen it can, with equal reasonableness, 
be inferred that the accident in question was due to another cause 
then [sic] the negligence of the defendant, the doctrine cannot be 
invoked." Defendants Brief p. 21. First, Saliman is completely 
factually inapposite, dealing with a situation in which a steel 
door fell upon the head of the plaintiff while he was making a 
delivery to the defendant's store. Further, it is a very old case, 
(1948), which has been superceded by current Utah law: 
11 
Before a plaintiff is entitled to a jury instruction on 
res ipsa loquitur, the plaintiff must have presented 
evidence that the occurrence of the incident is "more 
probably than not caused by negligence." The plaintiff 
need not eliminate all possible inferences of non-
negligence, but the balance of probabilities must weigh 
in favor of negligence, or res ipsa loquitur does not 
apply. 
Kitchen v. Cal Gas Co.. 821 P.2d 458, 464 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 
(citation omitted) (emphasis in original). Further, "for the 
plaintiff to establish res ipsa loquitur, he need not eliminate all 
other possible causes beyond a reasonable doubt," including a 
sudden emergency." Boring, 739 P.2d at 885. 
Defendant suggests that Bettner does not support plaintiff's 
position, citing some language from Bettner: "[T]he fact that one 
car hits another from the rear does not entitle one to any 
instruction, whether considering a presumption of negligence or a 
normal res ipsa loquitur instruction. Instead, the court must look 
to the circumstances of the accident to determine if someone other 
than the defendant, including the plaintiff, might be negligent." 
Defendant's Brief p. 21. The cited language, in fact, is very 
consistent with plaintiff's position that the plaintiff carries the 
burden of showing that the rear-end collision doctrine is 
applicable to his or her situation, particularly taken together 
with the rest of the case. 
Defendant states that "[p]laintiff's only argument in the 
case at bar is that since defendant's vehicle made contact with the 
rear of plaintiff's vehicle, he [sic] is entitled to an 
instruction," and that "the cases cited by plaintiff in her brief 
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negligent. Plaintiff, however, presented evidence that she was not 
negligent. The entitlement to an instruction on the theory of 
one's case does not rest upon whether or not evidence is contested, 
or even upon whether the jury believed one party's evidence or not. 
It is based upon whether or not evidence is adduced to present the 
elements of one's theory of the case. Because plaintiff presented 
all of the elements necessary to justify her requested instruction, 
the instruction should have been given. Failure to give it was 
reversible error. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING DEFENDANT TO PRESENT AN 
UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT THEORY TO THE JURY. 
Please refer to plaintiffs brief in chief for arguments 
related to this issue. Plaintiffs Brief pp. 28-33. 
III. PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT NOV OR, IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE, FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
Defendant sets forth Utah law on the requirement that a party 
appealing from an evidentiary determination marshall the evidence 
supporting the trial court's findings. Defendant's Brief p. 30. 
Plaintiff does not disagree with the basic principles of law 
outlined by defendant, but disagrees with defendant's appplication 
of the law. Plaintiff did, in fact, marshall the evidence. 
Plaintiff not only set forth the facts surrounding the incident 
from her point of view but, as fairly as possible, from defendant's 
point of view, also. Plaintiff made the attempt to be as thorough 
and exhaustive as possible in presenting both parties' versions of 
the facts short of reproducing every phrase and sentence of the 
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4) Defendant alleges that plaintiff did not indicate that 
defendant was "a football field" behind her and that he had slowed 
down to five to ten miles per hour by the time he reached her. 
Defendants Brief p. 6. In fact, plaintiff did note that defendant 
stated that he was that far behind plaintiff when he first saw her, 
and also noted other, inconsistent testimony on the issue. 
Plaintiffs Brief p. 7 n. 5. Further, defendant did not give 
consistent testimony as to the speed he was travelling; plaintiff 
has noted his various versions of his speed. Plaintiff's Brief p. 
8. 
5) Defendant alleges that plaintiff did not note that 
"[d]efendant felt that if the plaintiff had pushed on the gas, 
there would have been no accident whatsoever." Defendant's Brief 
p. 6. Plaintiff, in fact, stated that "[h]e realized Awe were 
going to hit if she didn't push on her gas.'" Plaintiff's Brief p. 
8. 
Many of the facts that allegedly were not marshalled are 
redundant or irrelevant: 
1) Defendant asserts that plaintiff failed to note that she 
was nervous prior to the accident and was "paranoid" while driving 
and did not like driving. Defendant's Brief p. 3. Plaintiff did 
note that she felt concerned prior to the accident and was 
extremely frightened at the time of the accident. Plaintiff's 
Brief pp. 5-6. Plaintiff's nervousness or lack thereof does not 
establish, in any way, her negligence or lack thereof. 
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A e i M i i i ill i mi in I v , 11 II mi i I mi I I "' « Itj i lut u l-o mention this fact does not 
constitute a faiJur'e to marshall evidence in favor of the trial 
court 's judgment. 
T '-•-_ -irnony on some .u. 
facts * - inconsistent dn^ ;ontradictory. Defendant's testimony 
was, likewise, inconsistent /-^tradictcr pertit 
1 a c t s ' -: *. o e t, ; ^  r 11, 
plaintiff i n e ! on pages * trough 
Some of the inconsistencies note^ * ^^fordar* are 
. ~: ~. ne parties 
were negligent: 
or example, plaint :rf/q f-r<-+-; r~ r^ w, . 
respri "I I i ,. *U^.M t J iiul 
directly probative of tu : neyngence 01 - - nereol • i it 
no - .,.* < nc-onsi stent th-*r * * P P H ^ ^ » - --+ iirorv cr im<> 
marshal i eviden *- vn ri\\s issue, v is ot nc significance. 
ipqpp inconsistency ^^  * "~<" * 
-luiiaant s M iei p 
'tit- i.Tip* ;\ sjnce plaintitt either saw defendant 
collision w^ immediate! y prior to xt ax " A 
latp •-. 
. - •^materia] w1--^ -. _- defendant's vehicle fishtailed 
.'•: spu;. ^ : L : respect u Lhe l^oility issues. Defendantf - "* 
I , 
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4) Whether or not defendant was in a hurry is not 
necessarily an important fact, either. Defendant's Brief p. 6. 
The extent of the damage resulting from the collision is of no 
relevance to the issues of liability raised in plaintiff's brief. 
Accordingly, plaintiff did not deal with these facts. 
Nevertheless, defendant claims that failure to make note of such 
facts is a failure to marshall facts. Such a claim does not have 
merit. 
In fact, plaintiff did a thorough job of marshalling the 
evidence in favor of defendant, and defendant's arguments are 
without merit. 
As discussed in plaintiff's principal brief, the evidence at 
trial supports her position. The alleged non-marshalled facts 
were, to the extent relevant, marshalled by plaintiff. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING DEFENDANT 
COSTS. 
A. Defendant Failed To Show That The Costs Requested Were 
Necessarily Incurred. 
Defendant correctly observes that plaintiff seeks a reversal 
of the existing status of Utah case law on this subject, including 
that by the Utah Supreme Court. If plaintiff does not raise this 
issue before this Court, she cannot take it before the Utah Supreme 
Court. Further, plaintiff initially filed this appeal before the 
Utah Supreme Court, which subsequently poured it over to the Utah 
Court of Appeals. Plaintiff does not dispute that the authority 
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ciLei,' i , leteii'Jl nil1. Lull, loii.li Lhw law as presently appl led; she 
seeks a change? in this interpretation. 
B. The Deposition Costs Awarded Defendant l iciu Mot 
Properly Supported, 
Under the present Utah practice • " [d ] epos it i on or msf :,;=; ai p. i u > t ; 
i u u j w i 1 1 iili 11 • ••» I ess t! le t,r i a,J cour t i s per suaded that they were 
taken i in good faitl 1 c .1 1 :l :ii 1 1 the light of the circumstances, 
appeared be essential for the deve] opment and presentati 01: 1 :: f 
t :-,. • . • Ames v. Maas, 8 16 P 2 1 168 1 7 5 (Utal i Ct ? j: j: • .1 993) 
(quoting Frampton v. Wilson, 60 5 P 2d 7 73 7 > 4 (Utah 1 98 0)) , 
"Deposition costs are reasonably necessary \ 0 thin the meaning of 
e 1: 1= I::l 1 = ::  :>mpl ex 1: :ia bi 11: e :: f the case prevents a 
party from completing discovery through less expensive methods such 
as interrogatories, requests for admi ssion, and requests for the 
I " *:! : " .umei its • Ames, 8 16 I 2 i 1 t, b 1 3 5 (quoting Morgan 
Morgan, /b>5 P. 2d 684, 68 7 (Utah ct. I q >{ > 1 9 9 0)). Plaintiff does 
not dispute that thi s i s the present state of the law, but ca] Il 5 
I 1: in "  t 111 11 1 • :: J 1, au: 1 i <=i ] i in i 1 1a bi ::::>! 1 :: f tl: 1 = • ieposi t:i on, cost, exception 
to Utah R , C"i \ I I" 54 (d) , 
Defendant notes that the Morgan court "i: <= .manded (not reversed) 
I' IIP 1 i'- in I I • I I:::,l: 1, = b r :ii a .] • :: :: i IJI : 1: t :: ie bermine if the 
deposition costs were reasonably necessary " Defendant's Brief p. 
This position supports p] aintiff's argument The remand to 
determ • * • : : •, .Il: , J • 1 j[i : a bi .• L U : . -prgan 
court teji Lao 'oni iu^or\ allegations presented to "justify \-
award of costs were inadequate to justify i t. -u" ' " ' 
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"In our review of the record, we cannot determine if the trial 
judge concluded that the deposition fees were reasonably necessary. 
In the findings and conclusions and decree, the deposition costs 
were simply awarded as part of the overall attorney fees, without 
consideration of their necessity." Morgan. 795 P.2d at 687. 
The current state of Utah law also requires that "[t]he award 
of costs should be narrowly made to guard against abuse by those 
better financially equipped lest costs of seeking justice become 
prohibitive for the financially ill equipped." Highland 
Construction Co. v. Union Pacific R.R. Co. . 683 P.2d 1042, 1051 
(Utah 1984) . It further requires, in an attempt to make such 
awards on a narrow basis, that the claiming party carry the burden 
of proof in establishing that deposition costs are necessary and 
reasonable. Id. Defendant has done nothing but submit a bald, 
unsupported bill of costs, having utterly failed to provide any 
sort of statement or argument to the trial court that such costs 
were reasonable or necessary. The trial court has made absolutely 
no finding that defendant's claimed costs were justified, aside 
from the bald order granting costs, or that defendant carried his 
burden of proof. Defendant, therefore, should not prevail on this 
issue. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court reverse the 
trial court's verdict finding defendant not negligent and the trial 
court's order taxing costs against plaintiff. Plaintiff also 
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requests a i ie i ».: t r l a l oi :i the issues of I labll i ty and damages, and an 
award of costs incurred I i i bringing this appeal. 
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ADDENDUM 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Rul* 
R u l e 5 0 - M o t i o n f o r a directed ~J "'- judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict. 
(a) notion for a directed verdict; when made; effect. A 
party who moves for a directed verdict at the close of the evidence 
offered by an opponent may offer evidence in the event that the 
motion is not granted, without having reserved the right so to do 
and to the same extent as if the motion had not been made. A 
motion for a directed verdict which is not granted is not a waiver 
of trial by jury even though all parties to the action have moved 
for directed verdicts. A motion for a directed verdict shall state 
the specific ground(s) therefor. The order of the court granting 
a motion for a directed verdict is effective without any assent of 
the jury. 
(to) Motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 
Whenever a motion for a directed verdict made at the close of all 
the evidence is denied or for any reason is not granted, the court 
is deemed to have submitted the action to the jury subject to a 
later determination of the legal questions raised by the motion. 
Not later than ten days after entry of judgment, a party who has 
moved for a directed verdict may move to have the verdict and any 
judgment entered thereon set aside and to have judgment entered in 
accordance with his motion for a directed verdict; or if a directed 
verdict was not returned such party, within ten days after the jury 
has been discharged, may move for judgment in accordance with his 
motion for a directed verdict A motion for a new trial may be 
joined with this motion, or a new trial may be prayed for in the 
alternative. .: a verdict was returned the court may allow the 
judgment to stand or may reopen the judgment and either order a new 
trial or direct the entry of judgment as if the requested verdict 
had been directed. If no verdict was returned the court may direct 
the entry of judgment as if the requested verdict had been directed 
or may order a new trial 
(c) Same: Conditional r ulings on, grant of motion. 
f
 f: the mot i on: i f :: r j udg men t i : z t v i i i, o c «i ia x J i^ . i. • -
verdi .-vided for in Subdivision (b) of this rule, is 
granted, the court shall also rule on the motion for a . 
trial, if any, by determining whether it should be granted ±i 
the judgment is thereafter vacated or reversed, and shall 
specify the grounds for granting or denying the motion for a 
new trial. If the motion for a new tri a] :i s tlii 1. = 
2 3 
conditionally granted, the order thereon does not affect the 
finality of the judgment. In case the motion for a new trial 
has been conditionally granted and the judgment is reversed on 
appeal, the new trial shall proceed unless the appellate court 
has otherwise ordered. In case the motion for a new trial has 
been conditionally denied, the respondent on appeal may assert 
error in that denial; and if the judgment is reversed on 
appeal, subsequent proceedings shall be in accordance with the 
order of the appellate court. 
(2) The party whose verdict has been set aside on motion 
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict may serve a motion 
for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 not later than ten days 
after entry of the judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 
(d) Same: Denial of motion. If the motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict is denied, the party who prevailed on 
that motion may, as respondent, assert grounds entitling him to a 
new trial in the event the appellate court concludes that the trial 
court erred in denying the motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict. If the appellate court reverses the judgment, nothing in 
this rule precludes it from determining that the respondent is 
entitled to a new trial, or from directing the trial court to 
determine whether a new trial shall be granted. 
Rule 51. Instructions to jury; objectons. 
At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time as the 
court reasonably directs, any party may file written requests that 
the court instruct the jury on the law as set forth in said 
requests. The court shall inform counsel of its proposed action 
upon the requests prior to instructing the jury; and it shall 
furnish counsel with a copy of its proposed instructions, unless 
the parties stipulate that such instructions may be given orally or 
otherwise waive this requirement. If the instructions are to be 
given in writing, all objections thereto must be made before the 
instructions are given to the jury; otherwise, objections may be 
made to the instructions after they are given to the jury, but 
before the jury retires to consider its verdict. No party may 
assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction 
unless he objects thereto. In objecting to the giving of an 
instruction, a party must state distinctly the matter to which he 
objects and the grounds for his objection. Notwithstanding the 
foregoing requirement, the appellate court, in its discretion and 
in the interests of justice, may review the giving or failure to 
give an instruction. Opportunity shall be given to make 
objections, and they shall be made out of the hearing of the jury. 
Arguments for the respective parties shall be made after the 
court has instructed the jury. The court shall not comment on the 
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evidence in the case, and if the court states any of the evidence, 
it must instruct the jurors that they are the exclusive judges of 
all questions of fact 
Rule 54. Judgments; costs. 
( 
(] ) To whom awarded. Except when, express provision 
therefor is made either in a statute of this state or in these 
rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing 
party unless the court otherwise directs; provided, however, 
where an appeal or other proceeding for review is taken, costs 
of the action, other than costs in connection with such appeal 
or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final 
determination of the cause. Costs against the state of Utah, 
its officers and agencies shall be imposed only to the extent-
permitted by ] aw, 
(2) How assessed, The party who claims his costs must 
within five days after the entry of ji ldg ment serve upon the 
adverse party against whom, costs are, claimed, a copy of a 
memorandum of the items of his costs and necessary 
disbursements in the action, and, file with the court a like 
memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's 
knowledge the items are correct, and that the disbursements 
have been necessarily incurred in the action or proceeding. 
A party dissatisfied with the costs claimed may, within seven 
days after service of the memorandum of costs, file a motion 
to have the bill of costs taxed by the court, I n which the 
judgment was rendered. 
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verd-
or at the time of or subsequent to the service and filing of 
the findings of fact and conclusions of law, but before the 
entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be considered as served 
and, filed on the date ji idgment is entered,,. 
,rials; amendments of judgment. 
rounds Subject to a] 3 the provisions of Rule 61 , a new 
trial may be granted to all or any of the pcirties and, on all or 
part of the issues,- for any of the following causes; provided, 
however, that on a ™ ~ *H.on for a new trial in an action tried 
without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been 
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and 
conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct 
the entry of a r-?w judgment: 
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(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury 
or adverse party, or any order of the court, or abuse of 
discretion by which either party was prevented from having a 
fair trial• 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more 
of the jurors have been induced to assent to any general or 
special verdict, or to a finding on any question submitted to 
them by the court, by resort to a determination by chance or 
as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be proved by the 
affidavit of any one of the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could 
not have guarded against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party 
making the application, which he could not, with reasonable 
diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have 
been given under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict 
or other decision, or that it is against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be 
served not later than 10 days after the entry of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a 
new trial is made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it 
shall be supported by an affidavit. Whenever motion for a new 
trial is based upon affidavits they shall be served with the 
motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service within 
which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the 
affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended 
for an additional period not exceeding 20 days either by the court 
for good cause shown or by the parties by written stipulation. The 
court may permit reply affidavits. 
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after 
entry of judgment the court of its own initiative may order a new 
trial for any reason for which it might have granted a new trial on 
motion of a party, and in the order shall specify the grounds 
therefor. 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter 
or amend the judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after 
entry of the judgment. 
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Utah Code Annotated 1993 
§ 78-56-8. Transcripts — Impecunious defendant in criminal case -
- Transcript from electronic recordings. 
(1) (a) When a transcript has been ordered by the court, the fees 
for transcribing shall be paid by the respective parties to 
the action or proceeding in equal proportion, or in 
proportions as the court orders. A transcript may not be 
taxed as costs, unless the preparation of the transcript is 
ordered either by a party or by the court. The reporter is 
not required in any case to transcribe notes until the fees 
for this are tendered, or a sufficient amount to cover the fee 
is deposited in court. 
(b) If the court determines that the defendant in a 
criminal case is impecunious, the court shall order the 
certified shorthand reporter to transcribe the notes requested 
by the defendant. The cost of the transcribing shall be paid 
under Section 77-56-5. 
(2) Transcripts from electronic recordings produced by a 
certified court transcriber are governed under this section, and 
compensation is at the same rates as under Section 78-56-4. 
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